

Democratic Breakdown and Survival in Latin America, 1945-2005

Scott Mainwaring, University of Notre Dame

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, University of Pittsburgh

Why do democracies survive or break down? In this paper, we return to this classic question with an empirical focus on Latin America from 1945 to 2005. Our argument deviates from the quantitative literature and a good part of the qualitative literature on democratic survival and breakdown. We argue that structural variables such as the level of development and inequalities have not shaped prospects for democratic survival in Latin America. Nor, contrary to findings in some of the literature, has economic performance affected the survival of competitive regimes. Instead, we focus on the regional political environment and on actors' normative preferences about democracy and dictatorship and their policy radicalism or moderation. We argue that 1) a higher level of development did not increase the likelihood of democratic survival in Latin America over this long time; 2) if actors have a normative preference for democracy, it is more likely to survive; and 3) policy moderation facilitates democratic survival.

Paper for the conference, "Guillermo O'Donnell and the Study of Democracy," Buenos Aires, March 26-27, 2012. We are grateful to María Victoria De Negri for assistance in preparing this paper.

Why do democracies survive or break down? In this paper, we return to this classic question with an empirical focus on Latin America from 1945 to 2005. We pursue a new research strategy to address this question. Following a rich and extensive qualitative literature, we understand regime dynamics in terms of concrete historic actors. The survival or fall of competitive regimes depends on what political leaders, political parties, militaries, and other key actors do. These actions are shaped but not determined by structural forces and cultural patterns. But this qualitative literature has faced limitations in broadly testing arguments and theories because of the difficulty of scaling up from case studies. Following another rich and extensive quantitative literature on political regimes, therefore, the analysis in this paper is primarily quantitative so that we can get some preliminary assessment about the generalizability of some of the key ideas found in some of the qualitative literature.

We argue that the level of development has not directly shaped prospects for democratic survival in Latin America. Nor, contrary to findings in some of the literature, has economic performance affected the survival of competitive regimes. Instead, we focus on the regional political environment and on actors' normative preferences about democracy and their policy radicalism or moderation. We argue that democracies are more likely to survive when political actors have a strong normative preference for democracy and when they embrace policy moderation. The evidence also shows that democratic regimes are stronger when the regional environment facilitates the proliferation of those values domestically.

Our paper builds on three important insights by Guillermo O'Donnell. First, in 1973, O'Donnell published his famous *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, which criticized modernization theory for positing too linear a relationship between the level of development and political regimes. For a longer time span and broader set of Latin American countries, we replicate O'Donnell's argument that the level of development has not had a straightforward impact on the survival of competitive regimes in Latin America.

Second, in *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* as well as several other works he published in the 1970s and early 1980s, O'Donnell argued that the "threat" that the popular sector mobilization posed to dominant elites (especially capitalists) was an important trigger in democratic breakdowns in Latin America (O'Donnell 1978a). We build a related argument by claiming that actors' policy moderation or radicalism has an important impact on the survival or breakdown of competitive regimes.

After focusing on democratic breakdowns early in his career, in the 1980s O'Donnell wrote on transitions to democracy, culminating in the famous work he wrote with Philippe Schmitter (1986). This work emphasized the role of political elites, their commitments, and their strategic choices. In the "Introduction to the Latin American Cases," in the *Transitions* volume, O'Donnell first laid out some daunting obstacles to stable democracy in the region. But, and this is the third insight upon which we draw, he then argued that

My hopes are rooted in a subtle, but potentially powerful, factor. It consists of the fact that today, in most Latin American countries ... there has emerged a new element. Largely as a consequence of the painful learning induced by the failures of those (authoritarian) regimes and their unprecedented repression and violence, most political and cultural forces of any weight now attribute high intrinsic value to the achievement and consolidation of political democracy. This is indeed a novelty. (O'Donnell 1986: 15)

Other scholars including Berman (1998), Lamounier (1980), Ollier (2009), and Weffort (1984) have also suggested that actors' attitudes about democracy and dictatorship are important in explaining democratic survival and breakdown. Building on O'Donnell's insight and on related work, we argue that whether actors normatively (i.e., intrinsically) value democracy as a political regime has an important impact on its prospects for survival. We test this argument in a new way.

In this paper, we provide an explanation for the stability or breakdown of competitive regimes from 1945 to 2005.¹ During this era the twenty Latin American countries collectively experienced 644 years under competitive systems. For simplicity and to avoid repetition we occasionally refer to those cases as "democratic" but our study includes semi-democratic cases as well (we clarify this distinction in the next section). These 644 regime-years suffered 26 breakdowns. Our analysis explores why (and when) competitive regimes broke down or, conversely, what factors favored their survival.

¹ Although we code regimes in a trichotomous manner, in this paper we focus on the breakdown of competitive regimes (democracies and semi-democracies) into authoritarianism rather than on erosions from democracy to semi-democracy.

Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-2010

We classify political regimes in Latin America using a simple trichotomous scale that we developed with Daniel Brinks (Mainwaring et al. 2001, 2007): democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian. In this paper, we lump together democratic and semi-democratic regimes into a broader category of “competitive regimes.”

Our classification of political regimes begins with a definition of democracy that revolves around four dimensions. First, the head of government and the legislature must be chosen through open and fair competitive elections.² Elections must offer the possibility of alternation in power even if, as occurred for decades in Japan, no actual alternation occurs for an extended time.

Second, today the franchise must include the great majority of the adult population. This means something approximating universal adult suffrage for citizens in the contemporary period.

Third, democracies must protect political and civil rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom to organize, the right to habeas corpus, etc. Even if the government is chosen in free and fair elections with a broad suffrage, in the absence of an effective guarantee of civil and political rights, it is not democratic as that word is understood in the modern world. A liberal component—the

²The election of the head of government is indirect in all parliamentary systems and in presidential systems that have electoral colleges.

protection of individual liberties—is a necessary element of contemporary democracy.


Fourth, the elected authorities must exercise real governing power, as opposed to a situation in which elected officials are overshadowed by the military or by a non-elected shadow figure (J. S. Valenzuela 1992). If elections are free and fair but produce a government that cannot control major policy arenas because the military or some other force does, then the government is not a democracy.

Based on these four dimensions, we classify governments as competitive (democratic or semi-democratic) or authoritarian using a simple aggregation rule: When governments commit no significant violations of any of the four criteria, we code them as democratic. If they incur in partial but not flagrant violations to any of those principles we treat them as semi-democratic. They rank as authoritarian if they present one or more flagrant violations of those principles. In other terms, we employ the minimum score of the four dimensions to determine the overall level of democracy (full, partial, or none).

Waves of Democratization in Latin America, 1945-2010

Using this classification of political regimes, Figure 1 shows the evolution of democratization in Latin America since 1945. The figure documents an abrupt decline in the number of competitive regimes in the mid-1960s, which partly motivated O'Donnell's early work on bureaucratic-authoritarianism, and the extraordinary surge in the number of competitive regimes after 1978, which motivated his work on transitions from authoritarian rule.

Figure 1. Evolution of Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-2010



An important transformation underpins the historical cycles depicted in Figure 1. Competitive regimes were brittle until 1978 but they became resilient afterwards. A vast majority of Latin American countries experienced at least one period of democracy or semi-democracy before the 1970s but many such regimes collapsed shortly after their establishment. Starting in 1978, however, the newly established democracies survived important challenges and the cumulative number of competitive regimes increased as new transitions took place. By 2005, the cumulative trend had stabilized, and eighteen of the twenty countries in the region enjoyed competitive politics. This transformation occurred primarily because the breakdown rate of competitive regimes (i.e., the number of breakdowns divided by the number of years of competitive) plummeted from 9.3% in 1945-77 to 0.8% in 1978-2005 (the third wave of democratization).

Class, Modernization, and Strategic Contingent Action Approaches to the Survival and Breakdown of Competitive Regimes

In this section, as a way of highlighting what is distinctive in our analysis, we briefly outline class, modernization, and strategic contingent action approaches to understanding the survival and breakdown of competitive regimes and signal how we build on and diverge from these approaches. In our approach, democracies break down when powerful actors mobilize against them and overpower the regime's supporters. They survive when the constellation of forces that support democracy is more powerful than those that mobilize against them.

Although class approaches, strategic actor approaches, and our approach to political regimes agree on this broad formulation about why democracies survive or break down, in other ways they diverge. Class approaches assume a tight relationship between actors' structural position and their preference about the political regime. In this perspective, some classes strongly tend to be pro-democratic; others strongly tend to be pro-authoritarian.

For example, Boix (2003) posited that when democracy is feasible, the working class will always prefer it because democracy distributes income to the poor. Conversely, when a stable authoritarian regime is feasible, the wealthy will always prefer it, except perhaps under conditions of high capital mobility, which attenuates the cost to the wealthy of tolerating democracy. Likewise, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) argued that the working class consistently prefers democracy and the dominant classes oppose it, again based on the assumption that democracy distributes income to the poor.

In contrast, strategic actor approaches such as Linz (1978b) and O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and ours, which builds on the strategic actor approaches, assume that class position has a weaker influence on whether actors support democracy or authoritarianism. To the limited extent to which social classes overcome collective action problems and constitute coherent actors, their decisions to support democracy or dictatorship are historically contingent (Bellin 2000; R. Collier 1999). Specific social classes do not always prefer democracy or dictatorship, but rather support a regime or its alternative depending on the advantages and disadvantages the regime offers at a given moment in history. For example, in contrast to the prediction of class approaches to democracy, the Argentine union movement supported the authoritarian regime of Juan Perón (1946-55) because of the material, organizational, and symbolic/cultural benefits Perón bestowed on Argentine workers. Until 1983, the Argentine labor movement opposed right wing dictatorships but worked to undermine semi-democratic regimes not associated with Perón and even initially embraced the military dictatorship of Juan Carlos Onganía, which overthrew the semi-democratic regime headed by Arturo Illia (1963-66).

Any theory that infers actors' preferences about the political regime from their class position (e.g., as local landowners, transnational capitalists, or industrial workers) reduces important empirical questions—if, how, and to what extent structural forces drive actors' orientations towards democracy—to a convenient but often misleading theoretical assumption. Class approaches neglect the formation of actors' regime preferences in a given historical context.

Our theoretical approach also stands in contrast to modernization theory, which was famously formulated by Lipset (1959, 1960: 27-63). Modernization theory claims that more economically developed countries are more likely to be democratic. Many authors have demonstrated that higher levels of development are strongly associated with a greater likelihood of democracy. Recent work has also convincingly demonstrated that the likelihood of democratic breakdowns diminishes at higher per capita income (Epstein et al. 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000). However, the seemingly robust association between income and democracy does not hold for Latin America for the lengthy period from 1945 until 2005. As O'Donnell (1973) noted, the level of development does not predict survival or breakdown of competitive regimes for Latin America (see also Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005). During this period, competitive regimes were as vulnerable to breakdown at a higher level of development as at lower levels. Competitive political regimes have often survived at relatively low levels of development, and as the experience of Latin America since 1978 shows, they have also often survived despite high inequality.

We do not claim that modernization theory is empirically wrong in general, but rather that the relationship between the level of development and democracy is far from determinate until a high level of development makes breakdowns extremely unlikely. Modernization theory typically neglects the role of concrete historical actors in favor of macro level quantitative work on the impact of the level of development on the political regime; most variants of modernization theory are actorless. The fact that the findings of modernization theory have not held up for

Latin America raises questions about why this is the case. One fruitful way of addressing this question is to look at the political actors that endeavor to establish, preserve, or overthrow democracy.

If we accept the premise that political actors determine whether regimes survive or fall, then it necessarily follows that structural factors including the level of development do not operate *directly* on the stability of competitive regimes. Structural factors may instead influence the formation of political actors and the preferences and strategic choices of these political actors.

Our understanding of the breakdown or survival of competitive regimes draws on contingent action approaches such as Linz (1978b), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and Przeworski (1986, 1991). Like these earlier scholars, we emphasize the strategic interactions among different actors. However, our approach differs in two ways in relation to these contingent action approaches. First, these works focused on the regime coalitions that supported or opposed the incumbent democracy or dictatorship without analyzing the actors that underpinned those regime coalitions. In contrast, specific historic actors such as presidents and organizations such as political parties, labor unions, owners' associations, and the military form the core of our approach. These (mainly organizational) actors underpin the regime coalitions. This is a difference in the unit of analysis, not a theoretical conflict.

Second, O'Donnell and Schmitter underscored the indeterminate nature of actors' regime preferences in situations of high uncertainty. Our perspective sits between theirs and that of Berman (1998), who argued that organizational interests

and identities (and in her lexicon, their programmatic preferences), and therefore how parties position themselves in battles over political regimes, tend to be very stable over time. We share Berman's view that even in moments of flux and high uncertainty, actors' identities—in our analysis, specifically their policy radicalism and their normative attitudes about the political regime—powerfully shape their behavior. In other words, we emphasize the constraining effects of organizational actors and institutions. However, we share O'Donnell and Schmitter's view that at moments of deep crisis and possible regime change, actors' positions are considerably more subject to change than is ordinarily the case. We also strongly share their view perspective that leaders have real choices that sometimes determine whether political regimes survive or fall and that outcomes are indeterminate (see also Linz 1978b and Stepan 1978).

In sum, we do not deny the role of structural forces (the level of economic development, patterns of dependence, class structures, social inequality) in the constitution of political regimes. But the effect of such variables is contingent and diffuse; it ultimately manifests itself in the organization of political actors, in the relative distribution of their political resources, and in the normative regime preferences and policy moderation/radicalism of these actors. Any explanation of democratic stability that omits an independent assessment of political actors' values and orientations may overestimate the relevance of structural forces such as the level of economic development or income inequality.

Actors' Policy Radicalism and Normative Preferences for Democracy

Because the survival or breakdown of democracies depends on concrete historical actors, we focus on how actors' preferences and attitudes affect regime survival. In contrast to structural theories, we argue that two proximate causes affect whether competitive regimes remain in power or fall: whether actors have radical policy preferences and whether they have a normative preference for democracy.

Actors develop policy preferences that run from moderate to radical. Some actors also develop what we call a normative preference for democracy. Policy radicalism and normative preferences about the political regime are key, reasonably specific, and measurable components of actors' political identities. Actors form these policy preferences and their normative preferences about the regime in an interactive historical context. These preferences are not historically fixed, but as Berman (1998) argued, they *usually* tend to be fairly stable.

Actors are *radical* when their policy goals are located toward one pole of the policy spectrum (e.g., toward the left or right if the policy space is one-dimensional) and they express an urgency to achieve those goals (in countries where they do not represent the status quo) or an intransigent defense of these positions (where these positions represent the status quo). As defined here, radical policy preferences need not be on the extreme left or extreme right, but they must be far enough from the preferences of other relevant actors to create polarization. They are intense preferences; radical actors are unwilling to bargain or to wait in order to achieve their policy goals.

We hypothesize that the presence of powerful radical actors will make it more difficult to sustain competitive regimes. The level of radicalization and the power of the radical players affect how threatened entrenched actors feel by the establishment or maintenance of democratic politics. To protect their interests in cases of considerable radicalization, either on the part of the government and its allies or of opposition actors, some powerful actors are more likely to try to subvert a competitive regime or block its emergence.

This argument also applies to the government itself. Where actors fear that a competitive regime can lead to their destruction or to major losses because the government has a radical agenda—whether this agenda is transformative or reactionary—the costs of tolerating the existing regime increase. These actors’ willingness to abide by democratic rules of the game is likely to diminish, and the regime’s likelihood of survival decreases. Conversely, where most powerful actors believe that a competitive regime is unlikely to impose major permanent losses, they are far more likely to accept democratic politics. Where uncertainty about the consequences of competitive regimes is great and the perceived costs of playing competitive politics might be high because of radical actors, the likelihood that such regimes can survive diminishes (Bermeo 1997; Figueiredo 1993; Levine 1973).

A normative *preference for democracy* means that an actor values democracy intrinsically, i.e., above any policy outcomes. The actor has an ideological commitment to democracy as the best kind of political regime. It is expressed in the willingness of political actors to incur policy costs in order to defend the competitive regime. Many scholars have claimed that democracy has intrinsic value (Dahl 1971:

17-32; Dahl 1989; Lamounier 1981; Przeworski 1999; O'Donnell 2010; Weffort 1984, 1989). If scholars believe that democracy has inherent value, political leaders and other actors can also value democracy on intrinsic grounds. A normative preference for democracy is different from situational or opportunistic behavior in which an actor's support for the regime is contingent on policy results.

When candidates acknowledge their defeat in an election instead of challenging the adverse results, they signal commitment to the principles of the democratic regime. When government leaders accept a congressional defeat on an important issue, even if they could manipulate procedural rules to impose their preferred legislation, they signal commitment to existing procedures. These signals are credible to others because they are costly. Such behaviors are consistent with what Max Weber called "value rationality."

We hypothesize that a strong normative preference for democracy among political forces will make competitive regimes more resilient. Strong normative preferences for democracy limit how actors pursue their policy goals. If actors value the regime on intrinsic grounds, they are more willing to endure policies that hurt their interests because they perceive them as legitimate binding decisions. Conversely, they may be willing to reject beneficial policies because they are not adopted by a legitimate regime.

Our emphasis on actors' normative attitudes toward democracy draws on multiple traditions in political science and sociology. Lipset (1959) underscored the importance of legitimacy for the survival of democracy. Linz's (1978a, 1978b) distinctions between the loyal, semi-loyal, and disloyal oppositions revolve around

differences in attitudes toward the regime. In his work, these differences in attitudes toward the regime have an important impact on actors' behavior and therefore on regime dynamics and outcomes. Several other works have also underscored the effect of actors' attitudes toward democracy and dictatorship on regime outcomes (Berman 1998; Dahl 1971: 124-188; O'Donnell 1986: 15-18; Ollier 2009; Stepan 1971: 153-187; Walker 1990; Weffort 1984).

Although many works have staked a claim about the importance of actors' normative regime preferences, empirically demonstrating this point is difficult for a large set of countries over a long period of time. No previous quantitative analysis has undertaken such an endeavor because of problems of conceptualization, measurement, data gathering, and endogeneity.

Coding Radicalism and Preferences for Democracy

One of the critical challenges we faced in testing our hypotheses was data collection and measurement. From the outset, it was clear that we needed a combination of quantitative testing to examine the generalizability of arguments for twenty countries over a long period of time and of qualitative case studies to probe the causal mechanisms in a deeper way. The challenge for the quantitative work was figuring out a way to determine the most important actors in the twenty countries and code their policy radicalism and their normative regime preferences.

We engaged a team of nineteen research assistants to do this work. They undertook extensive research to prepare lengthy country reports that followed

detailed coding rules.³ The research team identified major books and articles dealing with the political history of the country, and the reports described the main political actors during each presidential administration between 1944 and 2010. One researcher (occasionally two or three) covered each of the twenty countries under study (some researchers coded more than one country). The reports identified a parsimonious set of actors (usually 3 to 7 per administration) that were most prominent in the historiography of each period. Actors were included in the list if they were individuals, organizations, or movements that controlled enough political resources to exercise strong influence in the competition for power. Together, the reports discussed 1,459 political actors for over 290 administrations. The president was almost always identified as a powerful actor (with the exception of a few puppet presidents). Political parties, trade unions, business associations, the military, media organizations, and social movements were also commonly among the most important actors.

Researchers followed detailed coding rules to detect instances of radicalism and normative preferences for democracy. This team did not code the trichotomous regime scale to avoid contamination between the coding of the dependent and the independent variables in our study.

The researchers coded political actors as *radical* when they met any of the following conditions: (1) the actor expressed an uncompromising preference to achieve leftist or rightist policy positions in the short run or to preserve extreme

³ The reports were on average 83 single spaced pages, and the mean number of references used to generate the report was 46.

positions where they were already in place; or (2) expressed willingness to subvert the law in order to achieve some policy goals. The government was also coded as radical if (3) it implemented polarizing policies that deliberately imposed substantial costs to other actors (e.g., expropriations without compensation; labor-repressive regulations to increase labor supply). Non-governmental actors were coded as radical if (4) they undertook violent acts aimed at imposing or preventing significant policy change. If actors were divided or ambiguous about those positions, they were coded as “somewhat” radical; otherwise they were coded as not radical.

Most political actors pay lip service to democracy, so the research team primarily documented the *absence of a normative preference for democracy*. Actors were coded as not holding a preference for democracy if they displayed at least one of the following characteristics: (1) expressed ambivalence or questioned “bourgeois”, “liberal”, or “formal” democracy; (2) expressed hostility toward democratic institutions (parties, legislatures, courts, electoral bodies) instead of challenging their decisions; (3) questioned the validity of democratic procedures when they produced unfavorable results; (4) claimed to be the sole representatives of the people; (5) questioned the legitimacy of any opposition outside an encompassing national movement; or (6) consistently dismissed peaceful opponents as enemies of the people or the country.

Government officials were also coded as lacking a normative preference for democracy when they (7) introduced programs of partisan indoctrination into the public school system or the military, and when they (8) manipulated institutional

rules frequently in order to gain political advantage. Non-governmental actors were treated as lacking strong preferences for democracy when they (9) expressed willingness to subvert the constitution; or (10) accepted the use of fraud, political exclusions, or violence for political purposes.

Political actors were coded as having a strong normative preference for democracy if they did not manifest any of the ten hostile orientations; as "fairly strong but not entirely consistent" in their normative support if they exhibited ambiguity in any of these ten indicators; and as lacking a normative preference for democracy if they decisively met any of the criteria.


These rules provided a common protocol to generate comparable information for twenty countries over a long historical period. They are constructed so that the coding of both variables is conceptually independent of the coding for the political regime; actors' positions on policy radicalism and normative preference for democracy do not intrinsically affect a regime's classification. They are also intended to screen out instrumental, insincere deployment of democratic discourse. The coding rules are based on behaviors and discourse that are observable and documentable rather than strictly subjective evaluations. The indicators used to code radicalism and normative preferences for democracy do not eliminate the need for historical judgments about actors' preferences, but they put the judgments on a firmer ground.

We aggregated the information in a simple way. Actors were given a score of 1 (radical), 0.5 (somewhat radical), and 0 (not radical); and of 1 (a consistent and strong normative preference for democracy), 0.5 (a fairly strong but not entirely

consistent preference), and 0 (inconsistent, ambivalent, or hostile views about liberal democracy on intrinsic grounds). We then estimated the average value of both of the variables for every country-year. Thus, our variable *radicalism* can be roughly interpreted as the proportion of powerful political actors with radical policy preferences, and our variable *normative preference for democracy* can be roughly interpreted as the proportion of actors with a normative commitment to democracy in each country between 1945 and 2010.

Figure 2 depicts the historical evolution of the means for the two variables for the Latin American countries. The top panel summarizes the scores for country-years under competitive regimes (the focus of this paper). The bottom panel, presented for comparison, summarizes the information for authoritarian cases. Among competitive regimes, radicalism showed a sustained—although by no means monotonic—decline during the second half of the twentieth century. By contrast, normative support for democracy tended to increase over time. The gap between the two series stabilized by the mid-2000s. No equivalent trend is visible among the authoritarian cases.

Figure 2. Evolution of Radicalism and Support for Democracy, 1945-2010



A careful reading of the top panel in Figure 2 hints at the relevance of policy radicalism and normative regime preferences for democratic survival. In 1977, seventeen of the twenty countries in Latin America had dictatorships; only Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela enjoyed competitive regimes. Around this point in time, the series for the competitive regimes displays the lowest levels of radicalism and the highest levels of normative democratic commitment for the

whole period. This pattern suggests that in a hostile international environment, competitive regimes survived only in countries where political actors were consistently moderate and wedded to a democratic imaginary.

Comparison of the two panels in Figure 2 also underscores an important self-reinforcing mechanism. Powerful actors in competitive regimes display on average lower levels of radicalism and higher levels of normative preference for democracy than actors in authoritarian systems. This difference is hardly surprising, not only because of the selection effects described in the previous paragraph, but also because political regimes employ state capacity to protect their values and suppress potential threats. While authoritarian systems may simply repress most forms of dissent, competitive regimes may regulate the activities of radical groups and invest significant resources in policies intended to promote democratic values. As a result, the nature of the incumbent regime often reinforces the orientation of dominant political actors.

Alternative Explanations of Democratic Survival and Breakdown

Theories of democratic stability and breakdown have addressed a large number of alternative explanations. Accordingly, in addition to our main independent variables, we consider three theoretical clusters of explanatory variables: structural factors (economic development, class structures, dependence on primary exports) and economic performance, institutional design (party system fragmentation, presidential powers), and international conditions (the level of democracy in the rest of the region, US policies towards Latin America).

Level of Development. One of the most consistent findings in the democratization literature has been that the level of modernization has a major impact on the likelihood of democracy (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). In this paper, we emphasize an argument made by O'Donnell in *Modernization and Authoritarianism* (1973): modernization does not necessarily increase the likelihood that competitive political regimes will survive (see also Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2003). We measure the level of development using per capita GDP in thousands of 2000 US dollars (based on World Development Indicators and Penn World Tables) and employ a quadratic specification to capture non-linear effects.

Class Structure. Diamond (1992), Lipset (1959), Moore (1966), and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), among others, see the prospects for democracy as resting significantly on the nature of the class structure. Rueschemeyer et al. argued that "(C)apitalist development is associated with democracy because it transforms the class structure, strengthening the working and middle classes and weakening the landed upper class" (p. 7). We use the percentage of labor force in manufacturing as a gross indicator of the numerical leverage of the working class. The size of different classes should be relevant to testing Rueschemeyer et al.'s arguments; indeed, they explicitly argued that class size is an important determinant of democracy (p. 59).

Resource Dependence. Because several scholars have argued that countries that depend on natural resources such as oil are likely to experience vicious cycles detrimental to democracy (Karl 1997; Ross 2001), we include a

dichotomous measure of natural resource dependence, coded as 1 if exports of oil and minerals typically represented more than 10 percent of the gross national income—in Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela during 1945-2005, and in Ecuador since 1973 (computed from the World Development Indicators).

Economic Performance. Several scholars (Diamond 1999: 77-93; Diamond and Linz 1989: 44-46; Gasiorowski 1995; Geddes 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Lipset et al. 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000) have argued that competitive regimes are more likely to break down if their economic performance is poor. We used change in per capita income (i.e., the rate of economic growth, based on our per capita GDP figures) to assess overall economic performance.

Party System Fragmentation. An extensive literature has emphasized the role of institutional design in creating stable conditions for democracy. One such argument has centered on the nature of presidential regimes. Linz (1994), Mainwaring (1993), and Stepan and Skach (1994) argued that presidential regimes with fragmented party systems are more prone to breakdown. They claimed that when presidents had minority support in congress, impasses between the president and congress were more common, sometimes leading to democratic breakdown. Cheibub (2002) challenged this analysis, arguing that there is no significant relationship between party system fragmentation and democratic survival in presidential systems. The debate about the impact of party system fragmentation on democratic stability in presidential regimes is not relevant for explaining transitions from authoritarianism, but it might help explain the *stability* of democratic and semi-democratic regimes. We created a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the

effective number of parties in the lower (or only) chamber was equal or greater than 3.0 in a given year.⁴ We employ a dichotomous indicator for theoretical reasons and because of missing data on the precise number of parties for Ecuador in the 1950s and Peru in the mid-1940s.

Presidential Powers. Shugart and Carey (1992) argued that presidentialism functions more effectively with weaker constitutional presidential powers. A high concentration of power in presidential hands encourages the Executive Branch to by-pass Congress and promotes institutional tensions in the regime. In order to assess this argument, we employ Shugart and Carey's (1992) measure of presidential powers.

Regional Political Environment. Until the 1990s, research on political regimes focused heavily on domestic factors (for an exception, see Whitehead 1986). Since the 1990s, however, scholars have paid more attention to international factors in regime change and stability (Brown 2000; Gleditsch 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010; Pevehouse 2005; Whitehead 1986, 1996). A favorable international environment might enhance chances for democracy, while an unpropitious environment might work against democracy. To explore this possibility, we included a variable (*Region*) to assess the impact of Latin America's regional political context on the likelihood of regime durability and change. We measured the regional political environment as the proportion of democratic countries in the region every year, excluding the country in question. The coding for this

⁴ The formula for the effective number of parties is $1/\sum(p^2)$, where p is the proportion of seats obtained by each party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).

independent variable was based on our trichotomous measure of democracy (with semi-democratic countries counting as half). The values can theoretically range from zero, if none of the other 19 countries in the region were democratic in a given year, to 1 if the other 19 countries were democratic in that year.

US Foreign Policy. As a hegemonic power in the Americas, the US can affect the likelihood of transitions to competitive regimes and of regime breakdowns. We created a continuous scale to assess the orientation of US administrations towards democracy in Latin America. Using historical sources, we answered eight dichotomous questions about US policymakers. Four captured policies and attitudes harmful to democracy,⁵ while four others addressed behaviors intended to support democracy in Latin America.⁶ The first set of questions was coded -1 when the answer was affirmative, and the second set was coded +1 when the answer was affirmative. The resulting scores for each administration (from -4 to 4) were re-scaled to create a continuous index called *US Policy*, ranging between 0 and 1 (where 1 indicates maximum support for democracy).

⁵ Whether US leaders (1) supported coups or armed rebellions against competitive regimes; (2) limited the sovereignty (and hence democracy) of Latin American countries through military interventions; (3) clearly supported authoritarian regimes; or (4) expressed the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies because of cultural dispositions.

⁶ Whether US leaders: (1) expressed a preference for democracy even when there were tradeoffs with US economic or security interests; (2) promoted the democratization of authoritarian regimes or made efforts to bolster democracies under threat; (3) criticized authoritarian regimes that were not leftist; and (4) practiced a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a competitive regime.

Estimation and Results

We estimated the risk of democratic breakdown using a discrete-time survival model. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator coded as 1 for years if the competitive regime broke down and was replaced by an authoritarian system and 0 if it survived that year. Accordingly, a positive coefficient in the regression results signals a greater likelihood that a competitive regime would break down. In addition to our main independent variables, *Radicalism* and *Preference for democracy*, the equation includes eight predictors reflecting the three clusters of variables described in the previous section (structural factors and economic performance, institutional design, and international political conditions).

Following Carter and Signorino (2010) we also controlled for duration-dependence using a cubic transformation of the regime's age (measured in years). This factor is relevant for econometric as well as for substantive reasons. Rustow (1970) argued that following a regime transition, the "habituation" phase is critical to establish the long-term survival of the regime. The cubic transformation of age allows us to assess whether the hazard rate for democracies changes over time and whether they truly "consolidate" in the long run.

Table 1. Survival Models for Competitive Regimes, 1945-2005

	Model 1.1		Model 1.2	
	Estimate	(s. e.)	Estimate	(s. e.)
Radicalism			3.047 *	(1.140)
Preference for Democracy			-3.686 *	(1.534)
Per capita GDP (t-1)	-1.071	(0.568)	-0.043	(0.670)
Per capita GDP ²	0.133	(0.078)	0.040	(0.091)
Growth, t-1	4.990	(6.203)	2.663	(6.185)
Industrial labor force, t-1	-0.011	(0.035)	0.026	(0.039)
Oil and mineral exports	-0.673	(0.676)	-0.884	(0.669)
Multipartism, t	0.102	(0.462)	-0.325	(0.519)
Presidential powers	-0.216 *	(0.074)	-0.228 *	(0.090)
Region, t-1	-4.307 *	(1.502)	-4.901 *	(1.929)
US policy, t	-0.795	(0.768)	-0.256	(0.865)
Age of the regime	0.049	(0.127)	0.328 *	(0.158)
Age of regime ²	-0.002	(0.007)	-0.015	(0.009)
Age of regime ³	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Constant	3.667 *	(1.801)	-0.055	(2.279)
N (regime-years)	644		644	
Pseudo-R	0.16		0.31	

Entries are logistic regression coefficients (* significant at the .05 level).

Table 1 presents logistic regression survival estimates. Model 1.1 is provided for reference, and it excludes our main independent variables so that we can verify whether structural and economic performance variables affect democratic survival before we add the variables for radicalism and normative preference for democracy. Only two control variables present significant effects: a more democratic regional environment considerably reduces the risk of democratic breakdown, while—against theoretical expectations—greater presidential powers also tend to reduce

the risk of instability.⁷ Consistent with O'Donnell's *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, per capita income had no impact on the survival prospects of competitive regimes in Latin America from 1945 to 2005. None of the other structural variables has a direct impact on democratic survival. Multipartyism and US Policy exercise influence in the expected direction, but their coefficients are also statistically insignificant. The rate of economic growth did not affect the likelihood of regime survival; many competitive regimes survived in the third wave despite abysmal economic performance, and before 1978, some broke down despite respectable economic performance.

These findings remain consistent in Model 1.2, which includes our measures of radicalism and normative preferences for democracy. Four results in Model 1.2 deserve comment. First, actors' policy radicalism has a big impact on the capacity of competitive regimes to survive. Radical actors raise the stake of competitive politics. If radical actors win state power, they can impose very high costs on other actors, making it tempting for the losers to resort to coups as a way of preventing major and extremely difficult-to-reverse costs. For example, the radical policies of Salvador Allende's government in Chile (1970-73) and of the far left pushed the dominant faction of the Christian Democrats, the Conservatives, and the military toward supporting the 1973 coup. They feared that the consequences of allowing

⁷ At least in part, this result may be an artifact of historical timing: trends in constitutional law drove constitution-makers to write more explicit powers for the executive branch in recent decades. Thus, there was a coincidence between the wave of democratization and the powers of the president established in the new charters.

the Popular Unity government to remain in power might be disastrous.⁸ Although this specific example invokes the fear that leftist radicalism created during the height of the Cold War, the same logic applies to rightist radicalism. Conversely, the Socialist Party's moderation after the reestablishment of democracy in 1990 made it easier for the democratic regime to survive.

This finding is consistent with O'Donnell's work (1973) on the level of threat as an impetus to democratic breakdowns, with Santos's (1986) analysis of the impact of radicalism on the democratic breakdown in Brazil in 1964, and with Berman's analysis (1998) of the impact of social democratic parties' radicalism or moderation on their behavior and indirectly on democratic survival or breakdown in Sweden and Germany in the 1930s.

Second, if actors have a normative preference for democracy, competitive regimes are far more likely to survive. Although this finding is hardly surprising, it indicates that O'Donnell (1986: 15-18) was prescient to argue that actors' normative preferences could go a long way toward offsetting many liabilities, including a high level of inequality, lack of a democratic culture in most Latin American countries, and severe economic challenges. Linz (1978b) emphasized a similar idea with his notion of democratic legitimacy; legitimacy enables a regime to offset performance problems.

Argentina is an example of how actors' normative preference for democracy can make a positive difference for regime survival. From the late 1920s until 1976,

⁸ This is reminiscent of Przeworski's argument (1986) that the cost of democracy is willingness to respect capitalists' bottom line interests.

few actors in Argentina valued democracy on normative grounds. Earlier works including Dahl (1971: 129-140), O'Donnell (1973, 1978b), Potter (1981), Rouquié (1982a, 1982b), Smith (1978), Viola (1982), and Waisman (1987, 1989) agreed on this point. As Rouquié (1982b: 341, 380) noted, "All political forces preferred winning over the adversary in power to safeguarding the institutions."⁹

Competitive regimes never enjoyed the steadfast support of powerful actors, so they were highly vulnerable to breakdown. In 1930, the Conservatives, the Socialists, the military, and even parts of his own party conspired against President Yrigoyen.

From 1946 until 1973, both of the main political parties (the Radicals and Peronists) and the powerful labor unions were quick to defect from the democratic coalition. In 1955, the Radicals supported a successful coup against Perón, and from then until 1969 they backed his proscription. In 1966, the Peronists and labor unions supported a coup against a Radical president in the hope that they would be able to regain state power by ending the electoral proscription against Perón.

During those decades, powerful actors tolerated competitive politics only if it brought desirable policy results.

After 1976, the key actors accepted democratic competition as the legitimate route to winning political office. This reorientation toward a normative preference for democracy allowed the regime to survive despite severe economic crises in the

⁹ In a converging opinion, Portantiero (1987: 281-282) wrote that "Both Radicalism in its Yrigoyen faction and even more so Peronism did not see themselves as *parts* of a system, but rather as a totality that expressed the nation and the people. The learning of loyal competition between government and opposition was never seriously undertaken in Argentina." See also Dahl (1971: 130-140); Gómez and Viola (1984).

1980s and in 2001-02, hyperinflation in the 1989-91 period, a steep rise in inequalities, and on average bad economic performance from 1983 until 2003.

When there were serious threats to democracy in the late 1980s, the unions and the main parties mobilized to protect it. Labor endured very negative economic conditions, but it never mobilized on behalf of a coup.

To illustrate the huge substantive effect of policy moderation and normative preferences for democracy on regime survival, consider the following estimates. Holding all other variables at their means, a competitive regime in which all actors are radical and in which no one has a normative preference for democracy would be expected to last for about a year. If all actors abandon their radical positions, the expected duration of the regime would increase to six years. And if, in addition, all actors embrace a normative commitment to democracy, the predicted lifetime for the regime would be more than 200 years.¹⁰

Third, a more democratic regional political environment considerably reduces the probability that competitive regimes will break down. This result meshes with the robust literature that has emerged over the last 25 years on international influences on democratization. A more democratic regional political environment fosters the diffusion of ideals about what is possible and desirable in politics, and it led to the establishment of legal norms in the Organization of American States intended to safeguard competitive regimes. The end of the civil war, the peace agreement of 1992, and the establishment of a competitive political

¹⁰ The predicted probabilities of breakdown for the three configurations are .796, .156, and .005, respectively. Estimates are based on Model 1.2, treating insignificant coefficients as zero.

regime in El Salvador helped inspire similar developments in Guatemala a few years later. Conversely, before the third wave, some authoritarian regimes served as inspirations for coups and authoritarian populists elsewhere in the region. For example, the establishment in Brazil in 1964 of a military regime that promoted the “economic miracle” from 1967 to 1974, and the military’s ability to quickly defeat the revolutionary left and contain the broader left helped fuel confidence in Southern Cone militaries and rightists about the potential that the armed forces in their countries could also govern successfully.

In sum, the results in Table 1 indicate that democratic survival is mostly driven by (the absence of) radical policy preferences, by strong normative preferences for democracy, and a by favorable regional political context (reflected in the presence of other democratic countries in the region, but not necessarily in US policies). The regression results are open to an obvious concern of endogeneity: if a competitive regime is in crisis, it could push some actors toward more radical policy positions or depress normative preferences toward democracy. Spatial constraints prevent a full econometric treatment of this problem here, but an examination of historical cases shows many examples in which actors' policy radicalism and their normative preferences help explain the regime outcomes, and in which the regime outcome is clearly historically subsequent to, and hence cannot explain, actors' positions. The effect of normative regime preferences and policy radicalism cannot simply stem from reverse causation.

Finally, Table 1 also underscores that structural factors had no direct consequences for democratic stability in Latin America. Structural predictors fail to

achieve conventional levels of significance even in model 1.1 excluding the more proximate causes of regime breakdown tapped by our variables for policy radicalism and normative preferences for democracy. O'Donnell (1973) was right to be skeptical about the impact of modernization on the survival of competitive regimes in Latin America. The finding for a broader sample of countries that higher per capita income lowers the likelihood of democratic breakdown (Epstein et al. 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000) does not hold for Latin America.¹¹

Model 1.2 also suggests that the baseline hazard changes over time, but the results work *against* the idea of consolidation: the coefficient for *age* is positive and significant, revealing a progressive increase in the risk of breakdown. This effect is non-linear: although every additional year elapsed increases the level of risk, this happens at a declining rate. Beyond year 10, the effect of regime age on the hazard rate is insignificant at the .05 level.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have introduced a novel strategy for the study of regime breakdown and survival, namely, the use of an actor-based approach on a large enough scale that it is possible to do quantitative analysis. Previous quantitative approaches to the study of democratic survival did not indicate who the key actors are, and they did not test propositions about regime survival and breakdown based on the observed properties of real political actors. Most variants of modernization

¹¹ The marginal effect of per capita GDP in Model 1.2, given by the first derivative of the quadratic function [i.e., $0.08(\text{GDP}) - 0.04$] is insignificant for the whole income range observed in the sample.

theory do not explicitly specify actors or causal mechanisms, so the reasons for the linkage between a higher level of development and a greater probability of democracy is not clear. Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) assume that the poor, middle class, and rich determine the nature of political regimes, but they do not establish that these broad income categories are actually capable of overcoming collective action problems and becoming political actors. Inglehart and Welzel's cultural theory (2005: 149-300) argues that mass political culture determines political regimes, but it does not clearly enough specify who the actors are and what the causal mechanisms are by which mass political culture influences actual political actors. Because battles about political regimes involve specific actors whose preferences about the regime are not easily predictable on the basis of the structural or cultural variables, we strongly advocate historically-grounded, actor-based approaches to studying regimes.

As opposed to this "actorless" tradition in the study of political regimes, another lineage that includes the iconic works on democratic breakdowns by Linz (1978b) and on transitions from authoritarian rule by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), as well as many rich qualitative case studies (Figueiredo 1993; Levine 1973; Stepan 1971; A. Valenzuela 1978) has focused on coalitions of actors or on concrete historic actors. The best work in this tradition has greatly enriched our understanding of why democracies emerge and stabilize or break down, and our core hypotheses flow out of this previous qualitative work. However, the generalizability of the findings from this tradition has been uncertain because of the limited number of observations. Our approach builds on insights from those

qualitative studies but, for the first time, extends an actor based approach to a broad range of countries over a long period of time.

We emphasize three substantive findings, which expand Guillermo O'Donnell's seminal contributions. First, the level of development did not affect the likelihood of breakdown of competitive regimes in Latin America during the long time span from 1945 to 2005. This null result generally confirms Guillermo O'Donnell's prescient analysis in *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*.

Second, actors' policy radicalism makes it more difficult to sustain competitive political regimes. When many radical forces compete for political power, the chances that some actors will find the cost of tolerating democratic politics too high increases. Radical threats encourage defection from competitive regimes. Conversely, pervasive policy moderation lowers the stake of democratic politics.

Third, along with Dahl (1971), Linz (1978b), O'Donnell (1986: 15-18), Ollier (2009), Walker (1990), and Weffort (1984), we believe that actors' normative attitudes about the political regime have a large impact on whether competitive regimes endure or break down. Some actors intrinsically value democracy far more than other actors. Democracy can withstand severe crises and protracted bad performance if most actors are normatively committed to the regime. Conversely, it is highly vulnerable to breakdown if the most powerful actors are indifferent to the intrinsic value of liberal democracy. These normative preferences about the regime are not reducible to actors' structural position or to broad societal cultural patterns.

Measuring actors' policy radicalism and normative preferences about the political regime is a huge challenge, and it would be fatuous to claim that we have fully solved all of the difficulties. However, if policy radicalism and actors' normative preferences about the political regime are highly important variables that are not reducible to structural factors or broad societal cultural patterns, as social scientists, we should strive to incorporate them into our analyses, both qualitative and quantitative. Previous scholars have done so qualitatively; we believe it is important to also study these issues quantitatively.

List of References

- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bellin, Eva. 2000. "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late Developing Countries." *World Politics* 52 (January): 175-205.
- Berman, Sheri. 1998. *The Social Democratic Movement: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 1997. "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions." *Comparative Politics* 29 No. 3 (April): 305-322.
- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, Archie. 2000. "Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16 No. 2 (April-June): 177-200.
- Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 2009. *Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data*. [cited April 2009]. Available from http://www.rochester.edu/college/psc/signorino/research/Carter_Signorino_2009.pdf.
- Cheibub, José Antonio. 2002. "Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 35 No. 3 (April): 284-312.
- Collier, Ruth Berins. 1999. *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- _____. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Diamond, Larry. 1992. "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered." In Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset*, pp. 93-139. Newbury Park: Sage.
- _____. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, Larry, and Juan J. Linz. 1989. "Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America." In Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, pp. 1-58. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen y Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. "Democratic Transitions." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3):551-569.
- Figueiredo, Argelina Cheibub. 1993. *Democracia ou Reformas: Alternativas Democráticas à Crise Política*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra.
- Gasiorowski, Mark J. 1995. "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 89 No. 4 (December): 882-897.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 115-144.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. *All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of*

- Conflict, Integration, and Democratization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Gómez, José María, and Eduardo Viola. 1984. "Transición desde el autoritarismo y potencialidades de invención democrática en la Argentina de 1983." In Oscar Oszlak et al., *"Proceso," crisis y transición democrática*, Vol. 2, pp. 29-42. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman 1995. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton: Princeton University press.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Karl, Terry L. 1997. *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 12 No. 1 (April):3-27.
- Lamounier, Bolivar. 1981. "Representação Política: A Importância de Certos Formalismos." In Bolivar Lamounier, Francisco C. Weffort, and Maria Victoria Benevides, eds., *Direito, Cidadania e Participação*, pp. 230-257. São Paulo: T. A. Queiroz, Editor.
- Levine, Daniel H. 1973. *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Linz, Juan J. 1978a. "The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain." In Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe*, pp. 142-215. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- _____. 1978b. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- _____. 1994. "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" In Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy. The Case of Latin America*, pp. 3-87. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *The American Political Science Review* 53 (1):69-105.
- _____. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City, NY: Anchor.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, Kyung-ryung Seong, and John C. Torres. 1993. "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy." *International Social Science Journal* 136 (May): 155-175.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1993. "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy - the Difficult Combination." *Comparative Political Studies* 26 No. 2 (July):198-228.
- Mainwaring, Scott, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2001. "Classifying political regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (1):37-65.

-
- _____. 2007. "Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-2004." In Gerardo L. Munck, ed. *Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Theories and Methods*, pp. 123-160. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2005. "Latin American Democratization since 1978: Democratic Transitions, Breakdowns, and Erosions." In Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, eds., *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, pp. 14-59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moore Jr., Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, University of California.
- _____. 1978a. "State and Alliances in Argentina." *Journal of Development Studies* 15 No. 1: 3-33.
- _____. 1978b. "Permanent Crisis and the Failure to Create a Democratic Regime." In Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, Vol. 3, *Latin America*, pp. 138-177. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- _____. 1986. "Introduction to the Latin American Cases." In Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, Vol. II (*Latin America*), pp. 3-18. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- _____. 2010. *Democracy, Agency and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ollier, María Matilde. 2009. *De la revolución a la democracia: Cambios privados, públicos y políticos de la izquierda argentina*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI/Universidad Nacional de San Martín.
- Pevehouse, Jon C. 2005. *Democracy from Above? Regional Organizations and Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Portantiero, Juan Carlos. 1987. "La concertación que no fue: de la ley Mucci al Plan Austral." In José Nun and Juan Carlos Portantiero, eds., *Ensayos sobre la transición democrática en la Argentina*, pp. 139-173. Buenos Aires: Puntosur.
- Potter, Anne L. 1981. "The Failure of Democracy in Argentina 1916-1930: An Institutional Perspective." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 13 No. 1 (May): 83-109.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1986. "Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy." In Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, Part III, pp. 47-63. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- _____. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- _____. 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." In Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds., *Democracy's Value*, pp. 23-55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ross, Michael L. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53 No. 3 (April): 325-361.
- Rouquié, Alain. 1982. *Poder militar y sociedad política en la Argentina, 1943-1973*. Buenos Aires: Emecé.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics* 2 (3):337-63.
- Santos, Wanderley Guilherme dos. 1986. *Sessenta e Quatro: Anatomia da Crise*. São Paulo: Vértice.
- Shugart, Matthew S., and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Peter H. 1978. "The Breakdown of Democracy in Argentina, 1916-30." In Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America*, pp. 3-27. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Stepan, Alfred. 1971. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 1978. "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil." In Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, Vol. 3, *Latin America*, pp. 110-137. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Stepan, Alfred, and Cindy Skach. 1994. "Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective." In Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Volume 1, *Comparative Perspectives*, pp. 119-136. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Valenzuela, Arturo. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 1992. "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions." In Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, pp. 57-104. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Viola, Eduardo. 1982. "Democracia e Autoritarismo na Argentina Contemporânea." Ph.D. dissertation, University of São Paulo.
- Waisman, Carlos H. 1987. *Reversal of Development in Argentina: Postwar Counterrevolutionary Policies and Their Structural Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 1989. "Argentina: Autarkic Industrialization and Illegitimacy." In Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, pp. 59-109. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

- Walker, Ignacio. 1990. *Socialismo y democracia: Chile y Europa en perspectiva comparada*. Santiago: CIEPLAN/Hachette.
- Weffort, Francisco C. 1984. *Por Que Democracia?* São Paulo: Brasiliense.
- _____. 1989. "Why Democracy?" In Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, pp. 327-350. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Whitehead, Laurence. 1986. "International Aspects of Democratization." In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. G. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3-46.
- _____, ed. 1996. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.